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You Get What You Pay For?:
Rethinking U.S. Organ Procurement
Policy in Light of Foreign Models
ABSTRACT

The U.S. organ transplant system is in crisis due to the
paucity of transplantable organs. Such a shortage exists
because otherwise viable organs are too often buried along with
the bodies in which they reside. Organs are wasted because the
existing U.S. organ transplantsystem sets up barriers to organ
donation-chiefly the legal presumption of unwillingness to
donate ("voluntary donation') and the National Organ
Transplant Act's ban on the transfer of organs for valuable
consideration. This Note surveys the qualified successes of
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, and France with their various
"presumed consent" models of organ procurement. It also
considers other proposals, including monetary and nonmonetary incentives for organ donation. In light of the
limitations of these proposals, this Note concludes with two
recommendations: (1) the creation of a trial program of
regulated open markets for cadaveric organs in one or several
states; and (2) the implementation of a national donor registry
with a system of priority based on willingness to donate. These
measures would best address the organ shortage within the
existing U.S. legal and ethical framework.
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RETHINKING U.S ORGAN PROCUREMENT POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

Every year in our nation 200,000 useful organs are
consigned to the maggots for ready conversion to swill. The
law indulges us in this practice while thousands anguish for
want of the buriedparts.1
In the United States, more than 100,000 people wait on the
national organ transplant waiting list. 2 Of those, approximately
74,000 are waiting for a kidney, 17,000 for a liver, 2,700 for a heart,
and 2,300 for a lung. 3 The gap between the transplants needed and
the transplants actually performed is daunting. Between January
and August 2007, fewer than 20,000 organ transplants were
performed in the U.S., from just 9,800 donors. 4 Because of the
difference between the numbers of transplants needed and
performed, the waiting list is growing-by more than 10,000 in the
last three years 5 and roughly 5,000 per year on average. 6 The waiting
list continues to grow despite the fact that 18 United States citizens
7
die each day while waiting for an organ.
That the shortage exists not for a lack suitable organs, but for
the fact that most suitable organs are buried with their original
owners, renders the situation all the more regrettable-and

1.
Shelby E. Robinson, Organs for Sale? An Analysis of Proposed Systems for
Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1019 (1999) (citing Theodore
Silver, The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a ProposedModel Organ Draft, 68
B.U. L. REV. 681, 681 (1988)).
Data,
Organ
Procurement
and
Transplantation
Network,
2.
http://www.optn.org/data/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2008) [hereinafter OPTN Data]. The
OPTN is the United States' national network linking the professionals involved in the
donation and transplantation system. Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network, About OPTN, http://www.optn.org/optn (last visited Dec. 24, 2008). Congress
established the OPTN under the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) of 1984. Id.
The United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) administers the OPTN under the
authority of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Id.
3.
OPTN Data, supra note 2.
4.
Id.
5.
Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End
America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 72 (2004); United Network for
Organ Sharing, Report Identifies Transplant Trends for 2004, Mar. 17, 2005,
http://www.unos.org/news/newsDetail.asp?id=411 ("The organ transplant waiting list
saw an increase of 130 percent in the past decade from 35,751 patients at the end of
1994 to 82,885 at the end of 2003.").
6.
REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL Giwr ACT Prefatory Note (2007), available at
http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=l&tabid=63.
7.
Donate Life Today-Understanding Donation, Statistics, http://www.
donatelifetoday.com/content/understanding-donationlstatistics (last visited Dec. 24,
2008).
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correctable. 8 Thousands of U.S. citizens die each year in ways that
leave their organs intact and suitable for harvesting. 9
The
minority-twenty-five percent-who have volunteered for organ
donation cannot nearly support the nation's transplant needs.' 0
This Note addresses the U.S. organ shortage by analyzing other
nations' successes and failures with alternative organ procurement
systems. Part II describes the current state of U.S. organ transplant
law and the consequences of its failure to provide a sufficient supply
of organs for transplant. Part III considers the experiences of other
nations with alternative organ procurement systems, particularly
"presumed consent" laws.
It weighs the advantages and
disadvantages of these systems and other proposals that would create
incentives for organ donation and streamline the organ procurement
process. Finally, Part III also proposes that the United States use a
combination of these systems, establishing a regulated open market
incorporating elements of organ futures markets and implementing a
mandatory national donor registry with priority for recipients who
are also registered as donors. Part IV offers a conclusion.
II.

BACKGROUND: U.S. ORGAN DONATION LAW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

Organ transplantation became a genuine medical option in the
1950s and 1960s. In 1954, surgeons performed the first successful
kidney transplant, from Ronald Herrick to his twin brother Richard."
In the late 1960s, three more events led to modern transplant
practice: the development of a set of neurological criteria for
determining the occurrence of brain death, the first successful human
heart transplant by Dr. Christian Barnard in 1967, and the
development of immunosuppressive drugs to prevent organ recipients
from rejecting transplanted organs. 12 The wide availability of organ
transplants required the development of regulations governing organ
donations in order both to provide legal mechanisms for organ
transfer and to protect potential donors of cadaveric organs from
exploitation. 13
In 1968, shortly after the first successful heart
transplant, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act

8.
9.
10.
11.

Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 73.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 76-77 (describing the first successful kidney transplant).

12.

REVISED

UNIF. ANATOMICAL

GIur ACT, supra note 6, Prefatory

Note

(describing the first successful heart transplant and the events giving rise to the
UAGA).
13.
See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 77 (describing the lack of common law
protection that corpses and organs suffered from).
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(UAGA). 14 Within a few years the UAGA had been adopted in every
15
state.

A. The UAGA
When organ transplants became feasible, common law or
statutory property rights in human corpses or in the organs therein
did not exist. 16 The 1968 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act created a
17
statutory property right to donate one's organs, eyes, and tissue.
Under the original UAGA, donation could only occur if the decedent
had expressed her wishes to donate and the next of kin gave her
consent.1 8 The use of the word "gift" in the title of the UAGA was
widely interpreted to outlaw human organ sales, which were not
explicitly addressed in the Act.19 The 1987 revisions to the UAGA
clarified its intent and attempted to encourage more widespread
organ donation. 20 Among other changes, the 1987 revisions made
organ sales explicitly illegal but did not prevent the payment of
consideration for the performance of the transplant and its attendant
services.2 1 Thus, they kept the door open for all but the organ donors
to profit from the transplant process.
The revised UAGA also
protected the donor's intent to donate her organs upon death against
an override by her next of kin.22 It required hospitals to discuss the
option of organ donation with adult patients and with family
members of the deceased and also authorized medical examiners to
harvest organs if they could not locate the family members of the
23
deceased.
B. NOTA
In 1984, three years before the UAGA revisions, and in response
to a burgeoning movement toward increasing supply by permitting
organ sales, Congress passed the National Organ Transplant Act
(NOTA). 24 U.S. politicians were concerned about proposals like that
of Dr. H. Barry Jacobs, who wanted to address the already apparent
organ shortage by establishing an organ brokerage to facilitate
domestic and international kidney sales. 2 5
NOTA rendered it

14.

REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 6, Prefatory Note.

15.
16.

Id.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 77.

17.

See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 6, Prefatory Note

(stating that the 1968 Act created a "right to donate organs, eyes and tissue").
18.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 78.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 78-79.
22.
Id. at 78.
23.
Id. at 79.
24.
Id. at 79-80.
25.
Id.
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"unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in
'26
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.
In a provision replicated in the UAGA's 1987 revisions, NOTA
permits "reasonable payments associated with the removal,
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality
control, and storage of a human organ. ' 27 NOTA reaches further
than the 1987 UAGA in encouraging organ donation by permitting
payments for "the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages
incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection with the
donation of the organ." 28 Allowing payment for transplant support
services as an exception to the no-consideration rule has created a
large and profitable industry in organ transplants.2 9 Again, as under
the UAGA, NOTA permits all persons involved in the organ
transplant process to profit from it, except the donors.
Instead of permitting organ sales, NOTA sought to encourage
organ procurement by creating the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network (OPTN), a national system whose
responsibilities include establishing a national organ waiting list,
matching donors and recipients, allocating organs, controlling the
quality of organ acquisition and transplantation, and collecting and
30
publishing data concerning organ donation and transplants.
Regional organ procurement organizations (OPOs) work with the
OPTN and directly with hospitals and transplant centers to identify
and acquire usable organs, to define organ procurement and donation
protocols, and to procure and arrange the delivery of organs when
for
matches are made. 3 ' OPOs are the current legislative tools
3 2
encouraging organ donations and controlling organ distribution.
Despite the attempts of the UAGA and NOTA to encourage
organ donation, the numbers indicate that the current organ
procurement system in the United States has failed to keep up with
demand.33 A large majority of U.S. citizens-as many as 81%profess to support organ donation, but only one-quarter have actually
registered as donors. 3 4 The myriad reasons for this discrepancy
include a lack of immediate personal benefit to donors; fear of

National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
26.
Id. § 274e(c)(2).
27.
28.
Id.
See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 81 ("[E]ven though human organs are not
29.
for sale, everything else associated with their transplantation most definitely is.").
42 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2).
30.
Id. § 273(b)(3).
31.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 82; see also Fred H. Cate, Human Organ
32.
Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 77 (1995) ("NOTA enshrined
OPOs as the backbone of the organ procurement and distribution system.").
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 83.
33.
Id.
34.
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confronting one's own or one's loved ones' mortality; the difficulty of
persuading the bereaved to donate their loved ones' organs; a lack of
public awareness of organ shortage; and the failure of doctors,
hospitals, and family members to discover the deceased's intent to
Some commentators have explicitly identified U.S.
donate. 35
transplant law as the culprit of this discrepancy and of the
consequent problem of organ shortage. 36 One legal failure is the lack
of adequate incentives to donate. 37 Another legal failure concerns the
fact that, despite U.S. citizens' professed support for organ donation,
"the law presumes an unwillingness to donate," and then, even when
a donor has expressed intent to donate, it de facto permits the donor's
next of kin to override that intent by refusing to consent to the
38
donation.
C. Voluntary Donation
The legal presumption of unwillingness to donate, which is the
defining characteristic of an organ transplant regime often called
"voluntary donation" (but perhaps more aptly described as "presumed
nonconsent"), arises from the relevant portions of the UAGA, which
require an affirmative act indicating intent to donate, either by the
donor during her life or by the donor's agent or next of kin after her
death. 39 UAGA Section 5 permits a donor wishing to make an
anatomical gift to do so in one of five ways: by indicating that wish on
a driver's license or identification card; by will; "by any form of
communication addressed to at least two adults," including one
disinterested witness, during the donor's terminal illness or injury; by
signing a donor card or other record; or by "authorizing that a
statement or symbol indicating that the donor has made an
anatomical gift be included on a donor registry. '40 In fact, despite
polls indicating overwhelming support for organ donation, less than a
third of those who claimed they would be willing to donate reported
completing donor cards, and many who complete the cards do not
have them in their possession when they die. 41 Intensifying the
problem of the voluntary consent program is the fact that, as the

35.
Phyllis Coleman, "Brother,Can You Spare a Liver?" Five Ways to Increase
Organ Donation, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1996).
See, e.g., Cate, supra note 32, at 81 ("[T]he law largely impedes
36.
donation .. ");Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 86 ("[T]he law banning human organ sales
has the unintended and unfortunate consequence of restricting supply . .
37.
Cate, supra note 32, at 81.
38.
Id. at 81-82.
See generally REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supranote 6, §§ 5, 9.
39.
40.

Id. § 5(a)-(b).

41.

Cate, supra note 32, at 81-82.
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program is commonly applied, signed donor cards are useless without
42
the consent of a deceased donor's next of kin.
UAGA Section 9 permits a decedent's next of kin to make an
anatomical gift of the decedent's body or a part thereof, even if the
decedent did not express her donative intent while alive. 43 This
means of obtaining consent, however, has proved ineffective, despite
the fact that "required request" laws in many U.S. states mandate
that hospital or organ procurement personnel ask a decedent's next of
kin to consent to organ donation. 44 According to a 1990 study in New
Jersey, for instance, a required request law "[did] not ha[ve] the
desired effect of significantly adding to the supply of transplantable
organs." 45 Despite the mandatory request, many families of potential
donors are never asked for consent because hospital personnel often
overlook potential donors, at a rate that has been estimated at thirty
to forty-seven percent of medically suitable donors. 46 The same 1990
study found that some hospital personnel-alternately described as
"[1]ack[ing] ... a positive orientation towards organ donation" and
"lacking a commitment to organ retrieval"-responsible for
requesting consent to organ donation "have a lower success rate than
those with a positive attitude towards donation" because they are
relatively "[u]ninterested or uninformed. '47 Ultimately, regardless of
how they are asked, a decedent's family often refuse to donate her
4
transplantable organs. 8
Thus, the ability of a decedent's next of kin to consent to organ
donation on behalf of the decedent, even when the law requires
someone to request this consent, not only has limited benefits for the
organ supply but actually itself further limits the organ supply. As
one commentator has summarized the situation:
The law thus presumes that a person does not want to donate and then
minimizes the likelihood that a donor's legally expressed desire to
donate will be respected. Those laws that encourage transplantation,
such as required request statutes, frequently receive inadequate

42.
See id. at 82 ("[D]octors and hospitals fear professional criticism and legal
liability if they procure organs against the wishes of the next-of-kin.").
43.
See REVISED UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, supra note 6, § 9(a) (listing
classes of people who can make an anatomical gift of a deceased's organs).
44.
Cate, supra note 32, at 82.
45.
Steven E. Ross et al., Impact of a Required Request Law on Vital Organ
Procurement,30 J. TRAUMA 820, 822 (1990).
46.
Cate, supra note 32, at 82 (citing Ross et al., supranote 45).
47.
See, e.g., Ross et al., supra note 45, at 822 (concluding that, among other
remedies, "[a]dditional efforts to educate physicians regarding the need for organ
donation... may do far more to enhance the donation of vital organs than mandatory
request efforts.").
48.
See id. (discussing a study showing that required request laws have not
increased the procurement rate of organs at a trauma center).
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resources to assure their implementation and little if any enforcement.
49
In short, the legal framework is stacked against donation.

Moreover, a shortage of available organs for transplant and its effects
on the health of those on the national organ waiting list are not the
only ill consequences of ineffective organ procurement laws.
D. Presumed Consent in the U.S.
Several U.S. states use a modified presumed consent systemlike that of France-in limited circumstances. Under this system, the
decedent's consent to donate organs and tissue is presumed after a
"reasonable" or "diligent" search to determine whether the decedent
objected to the donation while alive. 50 Usually this search requires
giving the decedent's next of kin an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of consent. 51 Several states use this system to allow
coroners to remove body parts from cadavers for research or
transplant purposes. 52 The removal of corneas for transplantation,
for example, is governed by some form of presumed consent law in
many states. 53 These laws typically permit removal of corneas from a
cadaver during a legally required autopsy if there is a demonstrated
need for the tissues and neither the decedent nor the next of kin is
known to object. 54 Most of these laws have survived constitutional
55
challenges based on due process and the Takings Clause.
E. Obstacles to Reform
There are several ways in which people's beliefs about organ
transplantation hinder the effectiveness of current U.S. organ
procurement policy and could also hinder efforts to reform that policy.
The popular entertainment media, including books, movies, and
television, tap into fears of organ snatching and "distort both facts
and the capabilities of science and physiology. '56 Urban myths
promote fear of an open organ market with stories about travelers
Historical
waking in tubs of ice with their kidneys missing. 57
accounts of English medical schools during the nineteenth century

Cate, supra note 32, at 83.
49.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 84.
Id.
52.
Id. Cate cites twenty-one such state laws. Id. Almost as many states have
53.
similar forms of presumed consent laws permitting the removal of pituitary glands. Id.
54.
Id. Many states require the coroner or medical examiner to make a
reasonable search for such an objection. Id.
55.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 126.
Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn, To Solve a Deadly Shortage:
56.

Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 228 (2001)
(citing such shows as Walker, Texas Ranger and Law and Order, and the book and
movie Coma).
Id. at 228-29.
57.
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purchasing cadavers at high prices from body snatchers and
58
murderers have also fueled this fear of an open organ market.
Whether justified or not, this fear inhibits people's willingness to give
real consideration to organ procurement methods that involve
incentives for providing transplantable organs. 59
Among other common misperceptions that also prevent people
from embracing organ donation is the false perception that wealthy
and famous people receive priority in the allocation of organs. 60 This
perception is likely based in part on the news coverage that occurs
61
whenever a celebrity receives an organ transplant.
Arguably the most important sets of beliefs that affect organ
transplant policy are deep-seated moral and ethical beliefs about the
transfer of human organs. Lawmakers have been persuaded by these
moral and ethical objections that "the risks of legalized markets [for
'62
organ sales] are too great to justify their benefits.
The morality argument is based on the "fundamental concern
that the dignity of man would be debased if life, health or body parts
were exchanged across a market. '6 3
Courts, legislatures,
philosophers, and scholars have all argued that "the sanctity of the
body is essential to human dignity and autonomy" and, therefore,
that treating the human body "as a commodity to be bought and
sold.., would have a dangerous and dehumanizing impact on
society. '64 According to one commentator, this "concern about the
debasement of humanity" that underlies prohibitions on organ sales
is "[tlhe same concern . . .that has led to laws against selling one's
life, freedom, children, or sexual services. '65 Another commentator
describes the ban on human organ sales as one of "myriad examples
in law where individual autonomy gives way to the state's morality
interest," such as laws against "[d]rug use, prostitution, bigamy, and
66
incest."
Another widespread concern about human organ sales is the fear
that legalizing such transactions would have a perverse impact on
organ distribution-that "disproportionately poor people, often
minorities, would be persuaded or exploited into selling their kidneys

58.
Id. at 229.
59.
See id. at 228-29 (describing sinister urban legends and historical episodes
related to illegal organ procurement).
60.
Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox:
Overwhelming Public Support for Organ Donation vs. Under-Supply of Organs: The
Iowa Organ ProcurementStudy, 21 J. CORP. L. 767, 787 (1996).
61.
Id.
62.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 91.
63.
Id.
64.
Id. at 91-92.
65.
Robinson, supranote 1, at 1042.
66.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 93.
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simply to escape debt. '6 7 At the same time, "[c]onversely, it would
primarily be the wealthy who could afford to purchase them. '68 Poor
people might be "priced out of access to organs in compensation
systems," and "the organs to which they would have access might be
of lesser quality. '6 9 Thus, by this argument, critics of legalized organ
markets could be justified on distributive justice grounds, if banning
organ sales is necessary to "prevent poor people from becoming the
only 'sellers'... [and to] provide both poor and wealthy individuals
equal access to those organs being supplied-regardless of their
70
ability to pay."
Many critics allege that legalizing organ sales would discourage
purely altruistic organ donations, offsetting (if not entirely then at
least to some degree) the expected increase in organ supply produced
According to this theory, a
by a compensation system. 71
compensation system would deter voluntary donors who are ethically
opposed to receiving payment for transplantable organs. 72 Moreover,
altruistic organ donation may have a value independent of the organ
procurement context per se, based on the potential for selfless
donation to help bind society together. 73 By this argument, an organ
procurement system that involves compensation and discourages
altruistic donation might have other harmful effects on society.
Another ethical objection to legalized organ markets that is the
concern "that sellers would lack sufficient information to properly
weigh the consequences on themselves and society" when they decide
to sell their organs. 74 Sellers might be unaware of the added health
risks of living with one kidney rather than two.7 5 They might suffer
from "optimism bias," under the influence of which they understand
the risks but believe the risks will not come to fruition. 76 Thus, the
to
natural tendencies
and
pressures on sellers-poverty
underestimate the risks involved and overestimate their ability to
confidence in the
escape the risks-"seriously undermine[ ]" society's
77
validity of sellers' informed consent to organ sales.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
presumed
72.

Id.
Id.
Robinson, supranote 1, at 1041.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 93.
See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 1, at 1039 (discussing the negative effects of
consent laws on altruistic giving).
Id.

Id. at 1040 (citing RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM
73.
HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 73 (1971)).

74.
75.
76.
77.

Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 94.
Id. at 94-95.
Id.
Id.

362

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 42:351

F. Consequences
U.S. organ procurement policy has consequences beyond a
domestic organ shortage. A thriving global black market in human
organs has resulted from U.S. policy banning organ sales. 78 While

nearly all developed nations have banned the sale and purchase of
79
human organs, many countries do not strictly enforce these laws.

The illegality of the organ trade is insufficient to discourage many of
those faced with the possibility of dying on an organ waiting list, and
"transplant tourism" has become its own industry.8 0 In Bombay in
8
2001, nearly US$10 million were exchanged for kidney transplants. '
Patients use kidney brokers to locate sellers, who circumvent a ban
on kidney sales by signing an affidavit swearing that they are not
being paid.8 2 Before the U.S. invaded Iraq in 2003, that country was
known as "one of [the] world's best black marketplaces for human
organs."8 3 The lack of effective prosecution of these transactions
extends beyond Asia and the Middle East to Europe, as recent cases
84
in Estonia and Germany suggest.

U.S. doctors perform illegal transplants, too, often under
hospitals' "don't ask, don't tell" policy regarding transplants involving
foreigners who claim to be related.8 5 U.S. hospitals set their own
rules for who can be a live organ donor, and organ brokers can locate
hospitals that do not question a purported familial relationship
'8 6
between "donors" and "donees.
The lack of a regulated organ marketplace in the U.S. has
resulted in exploitation of the poor throughout the world.8 7 Organ
sellers often face debt, unemployment, and serious health problems;
as such, they are easy targets for abuse.8 8 Prisoners and the
homeless are among those exploited. 8 9 Sellers of organs on the black
market are often paid less than what they were initially promised,
while their financial situations and health often grow worse after the
transplants.9 0 Data from the Indian black market trade in kidneys

78.
Id. at 86.
79.
Id. at 86-87.
80.
Id. at 87.
81.
Id. at 88.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 89; see also Alireza Bagheri, Asia in the Spotlight of the International
Organ Trade: Time to Take Action, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POLY 11, 13
(2007) (describing the "sad reality" of the international organ trade, including
kidnapping and missing children).
88.
See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 89 (asserting that people in desperate

situations are those who most often fall victim to predatory tactics).
89.
90.

Id.
Id. at 90.
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support the concern about sellers' lack of adequate information about
the risks involved. In one study, 86% of the sellers there reported
that their health had "deteriorated substantially" after their organ
sales, and "[flour out of five sellers would not recommend that others
follow their lead in selling organs." 9 1 In short, U.S. policy and its ban
on organ sales have produced some of the same 92 immoral and
unethical consequences the ban was designed to avoid.
III.

ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO ORGAN PROCUREMENT
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Part II of this Note leads to the conclusion that a reconsideration
of U.S. policy on organ procurement and transplantation is in order.
The U.S. can learn from other nations' experiences to guide the
development of its transplant system. This Part of the Note will
explore the successes and failures of alternative approaches to organ
procurement outside the U.S. before proposing reforms for U.S. organ
procurement policy.
A. Presumed Consent
Most European countries and several South American countries
employ a "presumed consent" system of organ procurement. 93 A
presumed consent system is built upon the presumption that a
decedent has agreed to donate her organs upon death unless she has
left written instructions to the contrary. 94 The voluntary consent and
presumed consent models have alternatively been referred to as optin and opt-out systems, respectively. 95 Different countries have
96
implemented different forms of presumed consent.
1. France
The French system of presumed consent permits the removal of
organs "from the cadavers of persons who have not, during their
lifetime, indicated their refusal to permit such a procedure," with

Id. at 95-96 (citing Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health
91.
Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India,288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1589, 1591 (2003)).
92.
See id. at 90 (discussing failure of the developed world's plans to increase
organ donation).
93.
See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 224-25 (describing presumed
consent laws in France, Belgium, and Austria); Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K.
Johnson, Note, The United States System of Organ Donation, the International
Solution, and the CadavericOrgan Donor Act: 'And the Winner Is ... ," 20 J. CORP. L. 5,
21, 24 (1995) (citing similar presumed consent models in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil).
Id.
94.
Calandrillo, supranote 5, at 124.
95.
Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 224-25.
96.
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exceptions for the cadavers of minors and the incompetent. 9 7 The
French system requires a physician both to check a patient's medical
record for a written refusal to donate and to make a "reasonable
effort" to determine if such a refusal exists in writing elsewhere,
usually by consulting the patient's family.98 The "reasonable effort"
provision has had the effect of pushing the French system toward
voluntary consent controlled by the family, with French doctors
usually resorting to the consent of the next of kin-or deferring to the
next of kin's refusal of consent. 99 As a result, the French system,
described by one commentator as "modified presumed consent," has
not created the desired organ supply. 10 0
2.

Belgium

The presumed consent program in Belgium is similar to the
French modified presumed consent model. Belgium allows physicians
to harvest organs without the consent of the decedent's family, but
most Belgian doctors consult family members regardless and act in
accordance with the family's wishes. 10 1 The Belgian presumed
consent law improved organ availability by 183% within three years,
10 2
although it still fell short of satisfying the demand.
3.

Austria

Austria's presumed consent law is most like a true presumed
consent system. It differs from the models of France and Belgium in
one key respect: the Austrian doctor need not look beyond the
patient's medical records for evidence of a written refusal to
donate.' 0 3 Thus, the Austrian model is not hindered by deference to
the wishes of the next of kin. As a result, Austria has had much more
success in procuring organs, supplying kidneys twice as effectively as
the United States and most European countries.1 0 4 The Austrian
system still suffers from a shortage of organs, however, and has not
been as successful at procuring other organs as it has with kidneys. 10 5
Austria harvests livers at only a slightly higher rate-and actually
10 6
harvests hearts at a lower rate-than France and Belgium.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225.

104.

Id.

105.
106.

Id.
Id.
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Summation of European Presumed Consent

All three of these countries have higher rates of organ
procurement under their different versions of presumed consent than
the United States has under its voluntary donation system. 10 7 The
data generally indicate that presumed consent policies are effective at
increasing organ procurement rates from eligible donors.10 8 However,
presumed consent is not perfect. The French and Belgian systems
illustrate the limited benefits achieved when presumed consent is
legally or de facto subject to the decedent's family's wishes. 10 9
Moreover, opponents to presumed consent often cite moral and ethical
concerns when arguing that the presumption in favor of donation
violates the donor's personal autonomy. 110 As the argument goes,
when consent is presumed, there is greater potential for abuse or
exploitation of disadvantaged groups who would be less likely to be
aware of, and less likely to exercise, their right to opt out.111 Finally,
some commentators have expressed concern that presumed consent
112
might discourage altruism.
5.

Brazil

Brazil's experiment with presumed consent illustrates the
tension between the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the
presumed consent model. Brazil moved from a voluntary donation
system to a presumed consent system in 1998.113 In order to be
exempted from the presumption of consent, a Brazilian needed to
carry a Civil Identity Card or a Driver's License bearing the
expression "'non-donor of organs and tissues'.., engraved in an
indelible and inviolable manner."114
A subsequent amendment

107.
108.
109.

Id.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 125.
Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 225.

110.
Everton Bailey, Should the State Have Rights to Your Organs? Dissecting
Brazil's Mandatory Organ Donation Law, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 707, 721
(1999) ("We would be forced to incur the risk that some individuals would have their
organs harvested who otherwise would have exercised their right to refuse if they knew
they could have.") (quoting Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 125); Everton Nunes da Silva

et al., The Impact of Presumed Consent Law on Organ Donation:An Empirical Analysis
from Quantile Regression for Longitudinal Data, Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian
Economics Meeting, 2007, at 1, available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/anp/en2007/
047.html.
111.
See generally Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 225 (noting that presumed
consent laws may disproportionately burden vulnerable groups, particularly the poor
and uninformed).
112.
Id. at 225.
113.
Bailey, supra note 110, at 708 (citing Lei No. 9.434, de 4 de fevereiro de
1997, D.O.U. de 05.02.1997 (Brazil)).
114.
Id. at 708 n.4 (citing Lei No. 9.434, Ch. II, art. 4, § 1).
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allowed family members to opt out on behalf of decedents who did not
themselves opt out. 115 After three years, however, Brazil abandoned
the presumed consent system. 116 One study described the main
problems with the Brazilian experiment as follows:
i) lack of ample discussion about organ donation, especially about the
concept of brain death, which had caused fear in some of the population
that organs would be removed before they were clinically dead;
ii) hesitation of surgeons to remove organs without family
authorization; iii) as most poor Brazilians do not have personal
identification (ID or driver license), it meant they had no way of
117
objecting to donation while alive.

The failure of presumed consent in Brazil illuminates the system's
limits: any model of presumed consent must at least include checks
on the presumption in order to protect those who might be
systematically prevented from making the decision to opt out, i.e.,
those whose particular circumstances (e.g., poverty or mental illness)
make it unreasonable to presume consent-that they recognized their
opportunity to object and understood the consequences of their failure
to exercise that opportunity.
B. Presumed Consent with No Opt-out
Only a few countries employ a presumed voluntary consent
regime without the opportunity for the donor or the donor's family to
opt out of the "donation."1 8 Proponents justify this nationalization of
cadavers by considering harvestable organs a national resource. 119
As an extreme form of presumed consent, the nationalization of
cadavers creates some of the same problems that critics associate
with presumed consent procurement systems.
Nationalization
particularly implicates concerns about the ethics and morality of
denying people's right to control their own bodies.
Unscrupulous states extend nationalization of cadavers to take
advantage of state control over executed prisoners' bodies to remove
their organs. 120 China and Serbia have both been alleged to harvest
executed prisoners' organs, China at a rate of two to three thousand
organ removals per year. 12 1 Under Chinese law, an executed
prisoner's organs may only be removed if the prisoner's body is not
claimed, if the prisoner has consented, or if the prisoner's family has
consented. 122 Evidence suggests, however, that executions may be

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 726.
Nunes da Silva et al., supra note 110, at 6.
Id. at 7.
Harris & Alcorn, supranote 56, at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 226.
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scheduled around transplants and carried
out in a way that keeps the
12 3
donor alive until the organ is removed.
While nationalization serves as a useful example of an extreme
system, this Note does not give it serious consideration as a means of
addressing the organ shortage in the United States and abroad. At
the very least, nationalization may be assumed to be both politically
unpalatable and, in the case of prisoners, a violation of the Eighth
124
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
C. Other Non-Monetary Incentives
In addition to presumed consent, a number of policy changes
could encourage private decisions to donate organs without money
changing hands. In varying degrees these measures would increase
the transplantable organ supply, thereby saving thousands of lives,
and avoid implicating the anti-compensation principles of NOTA and
UAGA.
1.

Priority Based on Willingness to Donate

One proposal to encourage organ donation is to give priority to
people on transplant waiting lists who have agreed to donate their
own organs upon death. The nonprofit organization LifeSharers has
created a network of willing donors based on this idea. 1 25 Members of
LifeSharers sign and carry donor cards indicating their intent to
make an anatomical gift, of any needed organ, effective upon
death. 126 The card indicates the donor's preference that his organs be
donated first to the LifeSharers member who is the most suitable
match, unless no member is a suitable match. 12 7 LifeSharers
members retain the right to donate organs to family members. 128 In
return, of course, LifeSharers members receive the promise that they
129
will receive the same preferential access to donor organs.
LifeSharers discourages people from joining only when they discover

123.
124.

Id.
Id.

Such a practice is both a perversion of any existing organ donor method and a
probable violation of the Eighth Amendment. Further, the number of prisoners
executed in the United States falls far short of the numbers necessary to make
any meaningful difference in the shortage of vital organs.

Id.
125.
See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 119 (describing LifeSharers); see also
LifeSharers, http://www.lifesharers.com (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
126.
LifeSharers, How LifeSharers Works, http://www.lifesharers.com
howitworks.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
Id.
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that they need an organ by imposing a 180-day waiting period
between joining the organization and receiving preferred access to
130
members' organs.
Prioritization based on willingness to donate is appealing based
on an intuitive sense of fairness but also because, without the use of
financial compensation, it creates a strong incentive to donate based
on a person's naturally self-interested desire to increase his own
chances of finding a suitable organ. 131
However, while the
LifeSharers program is promising, its benefits are also limited. The
organization has just 10,500 members, and it has not yet had a
member die in circumstances that permitted recovery of his
organs. 132 The low enrollment has led to one critique that, with too
few people enrolled to constitute a reliable supply of organs,
LifeSharers gives its members the false hope that membership will
actually benefit them. 13 3 Critics of offering priority to recipients
based on their willingness to donate also cite the possibility of
discrimination in organ allocation against people who cannot
themselves donate for religious or cultural reasons and against those
who are not organ donors but have demonstrated altruism in other
13 4
ways.
In response to the first criticism, the false hope problem can be
corrected by enrolling more participants in the donor-priority system.
With respect to the second criticism, opting in to the program might
be better perceived as a social contract rather than an indicator of
moral worth (which is not, incidentally, a consideration in the current
5
voluntary donation system).13
UNOS has considered a similar program that would award
donors points toward increasing their own likelihood of receiving an
organ. 136 If UNOS were to implement such a program nationwide, it
could presumably generate wider participation, perhaps even enough
to constitute a reliable supply of organs to meet to organ demand of
3 7
its participants.1

130.
LifeSharers, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.lifesharers.com
faq.asp (last visited Dec. 24, 2008).
131.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 119.
132.
LifeSharers, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 130.
133.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 121.
134.
Id. at 120-21; United Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Comm., OPTN,
Preferred Status for Organ Donors (1993), available at http://www.optn.org/resources/
bioethics.asp?index=6.
135.
United Network for Organ Sharing Ethics Comm., supra note 134.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
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2.

Paired Organ Exchanges

Paired organ exchanges involve linking willing donors and needy
recipients in a quid pro quo. Essentially this constitutes a more
138
immediate form of the donor-priority system described above.
Suppose Person A needs an organ that a family member would gladly
donate, but the family member is not a match for A's blood and tissue
type. 139 Then suppose Person B needs the same organ, and B has a
family member who would gladly donate but is not a match for B's
blood and tissue type. 140 Finally, suppose A's family member is a
match for B and B's family member is a match for A. 14 1 If A and B
and their families have no way of connecting with each other, then A
and B are stuck on the waiting list while their relatives are sitting on
otherwise useful and transplantable organs. 14 2 A paired organ
exchange system would facilitate a transaction between A and B and
their relatives, effectively moving A and B to the top of the waiting
list in order to generate donations that would not otherwise occur. A
and B benefit from such an exchange.
Like the donor-priority system, this paired exchange seems
intuitively fair. It also creates incentives for people to donate when
they otherwise might not, again, motivated by a form of selfinterest. 143 It avoids the payment of consideration for human organs
that gives rise to numerous other moral and ethical concerns. 144 This
combination of advantages and minimal, if any, disadvantages has
attracted some support for paired organ exchanges.
MatchingDonors.com, a paired organ exchange, involves adding
information about willing donors associated with each patient in need
of a transplant to the existing national database of patients waiting
for organs. 14 5 Adding information to the national database could
identify cross-matches effectively to create new donors and enable
transplants that would not otherwise happen. 146 The website is a
private version of a paired-exchange system that provides an online
venue for patients and donors to meet and communicate, in exchange
14 7
for a fee.

138.
139.

Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 121-22.
Id. at 122.

140.
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142.
See id. ("Few people are willing to donate a kidney to a stranger-but they
would change their mind in a heartbeat if someone from the stranger's family had a
kidney that matched their relative's blood and tissue type.").
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 122-23.
146.
Id. at 122.
147.
Id. at 123; MatchingDonors, http://matchingdonors.com (last visited Dec.
24, 2008).
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A group of physicians at Massachusetts General Hospital and
Johns Hopkins have also created a paired exchange market. 148 Their
market is based solely on the availability of suitable organs and
requires no fee from participants beyond their (or their insurers')
payment for the procedures. 149 These physicians have successfully
coordinated transplant centers in performing two- and even three150
way organ exchanges.
3.

National Donor Registry

Although UNOS maintains a national organ waiting list
containing nearly 100,000 names, "no cohesive counterpart exists
that tracks willing organ donors." 151 Phyllis Coleman has argued for
establishing a national registry of donors and developing detailed
procedures for checking this registry. 152 Because accident victims
and other potential organ donors might not be carrying their donor
cards, or their cards might not be located in time to harvest their
organs, a national computerized registry could provide the
information to determine whether useful organs might be saved,
including the potential donor's consent to donate, the donor's blood
153
type, and whether the donor had a living will.
The usefulness of such a registry depends upon the procedures in
place for checking the registry. 154 Health care professionals, police
officers, and emergency medical personnel should verify a potential
donor's status immediately, whenever the circumstances are
appropriate. 15 5 Further, a national donor registry would promote
paired organ exchanges like those discussed above and would reach
more potential donors than private organizations that provide this
type of service. 156 The benefits of the national registry, however,
would be largely limited by its dependence on existing incentives for
potential donors to opt in to the registry. The national donor registry,
therefore, promises to minimize the number of willing donors who
slip through the procurement cracks but, for maximum effectiveness,
should be employed along with other policies designed to create
incentives for organ donation.

148.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 123 (citing David Wessel, Easing the Kidney
Shortage, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2004, at BI).
149.
Id.
150.
Wessel, supranote 148, at B1.
151.
Calandrillo, supranote 5, at 128.
152.
Coleman, supra note 35, at 39.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Calandrillo, supranote 5, at 128.
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D. Monetary Incentives
1.

Tax Breaks

State governments in the United States have experimented with
157
tax deductions to encourage their citizens to donate their organs.
A 2004 Wisconsin law, for instance, created a tax deduction of up to
$10,000 for expenses resulting from organ donation, including travel,
lodging, and lost wages. 15 8 Indiana and Kansas have considered
similar legislation. 159 Outside the U.S., "countries like Great Britain
have also weighed the impact of tax breaks as a partial solution to
alleviate growing organ shortages."'160 A proposed law in Israel would
reimburse donors for costs resulting from their decision to donate
161
organs, like the Wisconsin tax deduction.
Critics note that tax deductions for organ donors are a "direct
monetary incentive" that violates NOTA's prohibition on exchanging
valuable consideration for human organs. 162 Other criticisms of tax
deductions for organ donors are that they work only in states with an
income tax and that they are regressive-they benefit wealthy
individuals in higher tax brackets more than poorer people in lower
tax brackets. 163 Steve Calandrillo suggests that "[t]his inequity could
be remedied by provision of a tax credit regardless of income instead
of a tax deduction."'1 64
Another benefit, however, is that tax
incentives inducing the rich to become organ donors have the benefit
of not putting undue market pressure on the poor to sell their organs,
a common critique of proposed organ procurement systems involving
65
financial incentives for donation.'
Assuming tax breaks for organ donors do not violate U.S. law,
they could provide a valuable financial incentive to increase organ
donation while arguably avoiding the dilemmas of direct
compensation. 1 66 If successful, state-based efforts at creating tax
breaks for organ donors could also be expanded to create incentives
for donation after death. 167 Success at the state level should lead to a

157.
Id. at 111.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 112.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 111; see also Coleman, supra note 35, at 17 ("[S]ome commentators
object to any type of payment, arguing that operations should only be for therapeutic
purposes, not to make money ...").
163.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 112.
164.
Id. at 112-13.
165.
Coleman, supranote 35, at 17.
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Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 112.
167.
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uniform federal tax credit in168order to distribute the benefits of the
system as widely as possible.
2.

Futures Markets

A futures market in transplantable organs is a more radical
financial incentive some have proposed to increase the organ
supply. 169 Beyond increasing organ supply, the futures market has
the additional advantage of discouraging the economic exploitation of
the poor that occurs in an open organ market. 170 In a straightforward
version of the futures market proposed by scholars Lloyd Cohen and
Gregory Crespi, individuals could sell the right to harvest their
organs upon death-a futures contract.17 1 In return, if their organs
were subsequently taken, a beneficiary designated by the donor at the
time he executed the contract would receive the contractual
payment. 172 In theory, poor organ sellers would not be exploited
because living donor transactions would still be prohibited-their
consent would not be motivated by economics, and they would not
risk their health by entering such a contract. 173 Moreover, equal
access to the organ supply for poor organ recipients, despite income
differences, could be maintained using the futures market as a supply
mechanism but not an allocation mechanism. 174 In other words, the
system could be devised so that potential recipients would not be
175
responsible for making the payments.
Prohibiting live donor transactions may not adequately protect
the poor. 176 Even payments after death can coerce a poor person
through his concern about how his family will survive after his death
and lead to donation based on financial motives rather than
altruism-whether the pressure of monetary incentives is internal to
the poor seller or externally applied. 177 This may not be a tradeoff
inherent in the futures market system, however. Henry Hansmann
has proposed another form of futures market that alters the timing
and type of payment from the more straightforward model just
178
described.

Id.
168.
Id. at 108.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Id.
172.
Id.; see also Coleman, supranote 35, at 16.
173.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 108-09.
174.
See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1037 ("rhe organ buyer might be a
175.
governmental agency, a single private entity, or competing government and private
entities.").
176.
Coleman, supra note 35, at 16-17.
177.
Id.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 109.
178.
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In return for a promise by the seller to donate his organs at
death, Hansmann's proposal allows the seller to receive immediate
1 79
compensation in the form of reduced health insurance premiums.
The seller would have the opportunity to reconsider his decision
annually, electing either to opt in to the program and receive the
180
insurance discount or to opt out and pay the full premium.
Hansmann's plan redirects concern about coerced consent from the
seller's interest in his family's welfare after he is dead to the seller's
Otherwise, it shares the
immediate financial self-interest.18 1
advantages of the more straightforward futures market described
above, with the added benefit of flexibility for the seller to reconsider
his decision regularly. In fact, the lower level of commitment
required to enter the futures market as a "seller" with the option to
reconsider might encourage more potential donors to participate in
the program than would otherwise participate in a one-shot
contractual system. The problem remains, however, that such a
financial incentive would likely run afoul of NOTA and UAGA
prohibitions on exchange of transplant organs for consideration.
3.

Discounted Driver's License Fees

Many U.S. citizens do not register as organ donors because they
are indifferent, they are unaware of the opportunity to do so, or they
182
do not stand to benefit (even altruistically) from the donation.
Most states allow drivers to indicate their intent to be an organ donor
on their driver's licenses. 183 One solution to the widespread failure to
opt in is to offer drivers who indicate their intent to donate organs an
immediate discount on their driver's license fees when applying or
renewing their licenses. 184 In addition to creating a modest financial
incentive for organ donation, states could implement the discounted
driver's license fee system at minimal cost. 1 85 However, a discount

179.
Id.
180.
Id.
Id.; Coleman, supra note 35, at 16-17.
181.
182.
See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 113 ("Most choose not to opt in,
despite the fact that a large majority . . . actually support the idea of organ
donation ..
"); Coleman, supra note 35, at 36-37 ("With rare exceptions, the person
who donates his own organs will not even be alive to witness the benefit that recipients
enjoy.").
183.
Coleman, supranote 35, at 36.
184.
See supra note 182 (suggesting potential challenges to this proposal).
See Coleman, supra note 35, at 38. Coleman suggests that states might
185.
raise fees for all applicants by $1.50 and then offer a $5 discount to donors without
decreasing revenue. Id. The cost to the state could be further reduced by allowing
altruistic individuals to return their discount to the program and even to contribute to
a fund supporting the program. Id.; see also Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 114 ("[M]inor
costs to the state . . . could even be offset by raising fees or taxes in other areas, if
necessary.... .").
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would raise some of the same concerns as tax breaks regarding the
legality of exchanging organs for valuable consideration.1 8 6 These
concerns are at least mitigated when the discount is nominal, as it
almost certainly would be. 187 Moreover, Calandrillo proposes that a
discounted driver's license fee proposal could eliminate legal concerns
about the payment of consideration for human organs by offering nonorgan donors a tax credit in the same amount as the discount. 188
With donors and non-donors "in identical financial positions," organ
donors would receive no greater valuable consideration than nondonors. 189
As Calandrillo acknowledges, characterizing his plan in this way
invites a challenge based on whether it really creates incentives for
organ donation. 190 His response to this challenge gives the lie to his
assertion that the payment of a tax credit to non-donors "should
suffice to remove any legal concerns." 191 According to his argument,
the difference in timing creates the incentive. 192 People who are
"relatively indifferent or mildly in favor of organ donation" will choose
the "easier" option of the immediate fee waiver when renewing their
193
licenses rather than waiting until April to receive the tax credit.
Contrary to Calandrillo's argument, it is not difficult to conceive of
the added value of receiving the discount upfront as a valuable
consideration received by the organ donors and not by the nondonors.
Moreover, apart from the issue of exploitation of poor donors,
neither Calandrillo nor Coleman addresses the implications of this
system on donor consent; rather, Calandrillo cites this system's
manipulation of donor consent as an advantage:
By waiving driver's license fees in the manner just described, it is
reasonable to surmise that far more individuals will exercise their
preference to opt in, if only to avoid having to fill out the paperwork to
receive a future tax credit .... The moral of the story: simply requiring
people to go to the trouble of filing for a tax credit to opt out will

186.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 113.
187.
It is unlikely that any discounted driver's license fee could approach the
amount necessary to coerce the poor into trading organs for cash. See Coleman, supra
note 35, at 38-39 ("For example, a $5 discount is not sufficient to create the kind of
incentive to exploit the poor that direct payment for organs might.").
188.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 114. Calandrillo asserts that the only
difference between the positions of donors and non-donors would be one of timing"organ donors would receive the waiver of license fees at the counter or in the mail
when they renewed their license, and non-donors would receive the identical waiver as
a tax credit come April 15th." Id.
189.
Id.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 113-14.
192.
Id. at 114.
193.
Id.
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encourage the great majority of Americans to opt in to organ donation
194
up front.

Without some significant procedural safeguards in place at the time
of the license application or renewal and fee discount, it is not
difficult to predict that some donors and their families, after
accepting the fee waiver, might change their minds and insist that
they never really intended to consent to becoming organ donors.
4.

Reimbursement of Donors' Medical and Burial Expenses

While hospitals, health care professionals, and organ transplant
service providers profit from each organ donated, families of donors
typically receive nothing. 195 In order to draw attention to this
problem, several commentators have cited the tragic tale of Susan
Sutton. 196 After a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head left Ms.
Sutton brain dead, her family donated her heart, liver, corneas, and
some of her bones and skin for transplantation. 1 97 The hospital,
medical personnel, and nonprofit transplant coordination agency
involved made thousands of dollars, while the family buried what
remained of Susan Sutton's body in an unmarked grave because they
could not afford so much as a gravestone. 198 It seems fundamentally
unfair to donors like Ms. Sutton and her family, but moreover it
illustrates the room for a potential incentive to increase organ supply.
Shelby Robinson has proposed a "death benefits" system that
would compensate organ providers through the payment of financial
incentives to the deceased donor's family. 199 These incentives could
include "estate tax deductions, funeral expense allowances, or college
education benefits. '' 200
Robinson also describes a death benefit
system in which UNOS would offer a "token payment" of $1,000 to
families of organ providers-purportedly a small enough amount so
as not to "contravene the spirit of altruism" and not to coerce grieving
20 1
families.
Pennsylvania has made a move toward reimbursing donors for
medical and burial expenses by establishing the Organ Donation
Awareness Trust Fund. 20 2 Residents may make voluntary one-dollar
contributions to the fund, which allocates roughly three hundred

194.
Id. at 114-15.
195.
Id. at 115.
196.
Id. at 115; see also Coleman, supra note 35, at 16; Harris & Alcorn, supra
note 56, at 85.
197.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 195.
198.
Id.
199.
Robinson, supra note 1, at 1038.
200.
Id. (citing Andrew C. McDonald, Organ Donation: The Time Has Come to
Refocus the Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 177, 182 (1997)).
201.
Id.
202.
Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 116.
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dollars per donor for offsetting donors' medical and funeral
expenses. 20 3 While such a program is a positive step, it does not
approximate the actual expenditures incurred by donors. More states
should consider providing some form of burial compensation to create
an additional incentive to reward organ donors and their families.
E. Proposals
All the measures discussed above have various disadvantages.
The presumed consent model has had only limited success in Europe
and South America. 20 4 Non-monetary incentives could immediately
increase the organ supply at the margins by connecting would-be
recipients with viable donors, 20 5 and so a system incorporating a
national donor registry with priority based on willingness to donate
should be implemented promptly. However, such measures are
unlikely to address the severe extent of the organ shortage 20 6 and
thus also unlikely to significantly reduce organ recipients'
dependence on worldwide black markets. 20 7 A radical shift in
thinking about organ transplants, from a fundamentally altruistic
model to an incentive-based model, is required in the long term. This
Note argues that lawmakers should eschew such conservative
incentives (with commensurately conservative benefits) as tax breaks,
discounted fees, and reimbursement of medical and burial expenses,
in favor of a regulated open market incorporating elements of the
futures markets discussed in Part III.C.2.
1.

A Regulated Open Market

Governmental regulation of the organ market would be essential
to the success of such a radical reform. 20 8 An unregulated market for
the trade of human organs would likely create many of the problems
feared by opponents of any kind of incentive-based organ
procurement system, chief among them a sort of organ imperialism
involving exploitation of the poor and an inequitable allocation of
transplantable organs among the wealthy. 20 9 Such a market could

203.
Id.
204.
See supraPart III.A.
205.
See supraPart III. B.
206.
See supraPart I.
207.
See supraPart II.E.
208.
Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 233. Harris and Alcorn propose their
own regulated posthumous organ market that addresses the major concerns' of
opponents of a donor market. Id. at 232.
209.
See supraPart II.D.
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drastically increase the transplantable organ supply while reducing
210
the demand for black-market organs and the problems they entail.
It remains an empirical question whether a market approach to
organ procurement will increase organ supply.2 11 However, another
rationale, the "libertarian argument," supports the use of economic
incentives.2 12 James Blumstein has described this rationale as
follows:
This position emphasizes respect for the autonomy of the donor (and
the ability of the donor to choose), deemphasizes paternalism, and
strengthens the hand of the individual rather than the family.
Payment to "donate" allows a person to determine his or her own
organs' fate, respects the right of the buyer to contract, and recognizes
the ability of the medically needy donee beneficiary to benefit from the
213

transaction.

This understanding of incentives as enhancing a donor's personal
autonomy makes a regulated organ market more appealing on at
least one level than the presumed consent system that downplays an
individual's decision-making ability.
The U.S. should permit states to experiment for a reasonable
period of time with pilot programs creating regulated human organ
This would allow time to study the effects of these
markets.
programs, with the eventual goal of implementing a nationwide
program. The Harris and Alcorn plan for a posthumous organ
market should serve as a starting point in designing such a pilot
Though a more ambitious system permitting
program. 214
transactions involving living donors might provide more value, this
Note assumes that, at present, the moral and ethical objections to
such a system would prevent it from being implemented, even on a
2 15
trial basis.
In light of the UAGA and NOTA ban on exchanging valuable
consideration for human organs, such a pilot program must begin
with statutory authorization for an individual to dispose of his organs
under a contractual agreement in return for compensation to be paid
to the donor's estate or to his designated beneficiary. 216 By cutting

See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 106 (proposing that "a thoughtful and
210.
responsible regulatory solution in America might be the best response" to thriving
global black markets in human organs).
211.
James F. Blumstein, The Use of FinancialIncentives in Medical Care: The
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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 9, 27 (Andrew Grubb & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 1995).
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Id.
Id.
213.
214.
See supra note 208.
215.
See Calandrillo, supra note 5, at 107 (conceding, despite apparent
advantages, that "any form of legalized human organ market ... would be political
suicide to propose, entail significant administrative costs to establish and monitor, and
remain morally distasteful to many Americans").
216.
Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 232.
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the donor out of the financial benefits, this plan would minimize the
risk of a donor entering into a contract for quick cash.2 17 It would
also reduce the potential for exploitation of the poor, though a donor
might still be motivated by an interest in providing for his family
after his death. 218
The decedent should also be protected by
prohibiting relatives from selling his organs without his express
consent.2 19 This could be achieved by including in the statutory
authorization for this program an imposition of civil liability on
relatives who exert pressure while the would-be seller is alive and
criminal liability for relatives who attempt to sell organs without a
decedent's express consent.
The plan should also address concerns about the influence of
health care professionals pursuing transplantable organs against the
medical interest of the donor. 220 One way to protect donors from
overzealous doctors would be to require that the physician who
certifies a donor's death be independent of the decedent's family, of
the potential recipient's family, and of any institutions with a stake
in the transplant.2 2 1
A regulatory authority responsible for
administering the program could ensure independence along with
statutorily imposing stiff civil and criminal penalties for violation of
this independence.
The plan should eliminate concerns about inequitable organ
allocation in an open market by limiting the experiment to the supply
side of the market.2 22 Waiting lists would continue to determine
priority for organ recipients, with organ prices capped at a flat-perorgan donation rate or otherwise determined in advance according to
a fee schedule, with an allowance for some market-driven price
fluctuations.2 2 3 Moreover, inability to pay should not preclude a
potential recipient from getting an organ. A governmental funding
source, such as Medicare or Medicaid, might cover the cost of the
organ. In the alternative, under the Harris and Alcorn plan, the Food
22 4
and Drug Administration (FDA) would oversee the organ market.
The FDA could support the cost of governmental oversight by
charging licensing fees to private companies that would serve as
organ brokerage houses. 22 5 The FDA could also use a portion of the
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218. Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Blumstein, supra note 211, at 38.
221.
Id.
222. Id. at 39.
223.
See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 56, at 233 (describing generally the
governmental regulations necessary to prevent abuse of an organ market).
224. Id.
225. Id.
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fees to fund transplant opportunities for the underinsured and
22 6
uninsured.
2. A National Donor Registry & Priority Based on Willingness to
Donate
In addition to experimenting with a regulated open market for
posthumous organ sales, the United States should immediately
implement a national donor registry and a system of priority based on
willingness to donate. As discussed above in Part III, Subparts B.1
and B.3, these proposals do not implicate the concerns about coercion,
exploitation, and consent that most of the incentive-based proposals
do. They are generally consistent with the altruism-based organ
procurement system in place in the U.S. Nevertheless, they are likely
to facilitate organ donations that might not otherwise take place.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A staggering and unacceptable number of deaths occur each year
in the U.S. alone when people on the national organ transplant
waiting list run out of time. The vast majority of organs suitable for
transplant are lost when their owners neglect to identify themselves
as organ donors, despite the fact that most U.S. citizens profess their
support for organ donation. The discrepancy stems from a lack of
immediate personal benefit to donors, the difficulty of persuading the
bereaved to donate their loved ones' organs, a lack of public
awareness of organ shortage, and the failure of doctors, hospitals, and
family members to discover the deceased's intent to donate.
Various organ procurement plans have been either proposed or
implemented both in the United States and abroad in order to
address the reasons for this discrepancy.
Presumed consent systems assume that a potential donor has
consented to donate his organs, absent some evidence of intent to the
contrary. As implemented in several counties, presumed consent
systems vary based on what is necessary to show contrary intent and
how far physicians are required to go in searching for evidence of
contrary intent. Along with physicians' tendencies to attach too much
weight to the next of kin's wishes, the opportunity to rebut the
presumption renders presumed consent systems of limited
effectiveness in increasing the organ supply. Presumed consent also
creates doubts about donors' autonomy, the validity of their "consent,"
and exploitation of classes of people who might not be in a position to
opt out.

226.
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Nationalization treats transplantable organs as a national
resource, presuming the donor's consent to harvesting his organs
without allowing him an opportunity to opt out. Nationalization
raises grave concerns about donors' autonomy.
Priority based on willingness to donate gives preference to those
on the national organ transplant waiting list who have volunteered to
donate their own organs. While at odds with the altruism-based
organ procurement system currently in place in the United States,
this donor-priority system does not implicate the same moral and
ethical dilemmas as do other systems.
Paired organ exchanges allow willing donors whose loved ones
need transplants but who are not matches for those loved ones to
connect with each other in order to arrange a swap.
A national donor registry would store information on all
potential donors in order to facilitate identification of donors whose
donor cards cannot be located and to capture transplantable organs
that might otherwise slip through the cracks. Such a registry could
also be used to facilitate paired organ exchanges.
Tax breaks offer direct financial incentives to organ donors to
increase organ supply but might run afoul of the UAGA and NOTA
prohibitions on the exchange of organs for valuable consideration.
Futures markets allow organ donors to enter into contracts to sell
their cadaveric organs, either for immediate financial benefit or for
the benefit of a designated beneficiary. Depending on how they are
implemented, futures markets implicate concerns about coerced
consent and exploitation of underprivileged donors.
Discounted driver's license fees offer a donor a waiver of some
portion of his driver's license application or renewal fees in return for
checking the "organ donor" box on his driver's license. The nominal
amount of the incentive reduces, but does not eliminate, the concern
about coercion.
Reimbursement of donors' medical and burial expenses at the
very least provides donors' families with some form of posthumous
compensation for their donations. Such reimbursement would create
a limited incentive, probably with equally limited benefits for the
organ supply.
Regulated open markets would allow the sale of organs with
extensive government regulatory oversight in order to minimize the
dangers of exploitation and coercion. By providing donor-sellers
something closer to fair value for their organs, this option provides
the best option for addressing the organ shortage. If done in the right
way, taking precautions against abuse, it can also be a system
consistent with many people's moral and ethical values, including
most significantly the right to control one's own body.
This Note proposes that the states experiment with regulated
open markets for cadaveric organs. Making payments only to a
beneficiary or family member after the donor's death will limit the
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exploitative and coercive effects of compensation for organs. Opening
the market only on the supply side will help to ensure equitable
allocation of organs regardless of ability to pay.
This Note further proposes the implementation of a national
donor registry and a system of priority based on willingness to
donate. These would facilitate purely altruistic donations and also
self-interested transactions, but because they do not involve the
payment of consideration, they do not raise the same moral and
ethical concerns as the financial incentives.
With thousands dying on the organ transplant waiting list every
year, it is time to reconsider U.S. organ procurement policy.
Implementing this proposed mix of measures will address both supply
and allocation issues while protecting the essential interests of the
parties involved.
In the absence of this or similar action, the
continued failure to address seriously the national and global organ
shortage will constitute a death sentence for thousands more.
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